Proceedings of the Conference on Human and Economic Resources by Faruk Balli & Bent E. Sørensen








The Impact of the EMU on Channels of Risk Sharing 
between Member Countries 
 
Faruk Balli 
University of Houston 
 
Bent E. Sørensen 
University of Houston 
 
We estimate the amount of income and consumption smoothing (risk sharing) between 
countries  in  the  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU)  and  between  other  developed 
countries during the period 1970–2003. In particular, we examine if EMU countries 
display different patterns of risk sharing than other developed countries in the period 
leading up to and following the formation of the EMU in 1999. We find that income 
smoothing  from  international  factor  income  has  increased  in  the  EMU  since  the 
introduction of the EMU and that consumption smoothing from procyclical government 
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Introduction 
 
Income  and  consumption  smoothing  between  states  in  a  monetary  union  are 
potentially important for the functioning of the union because monetary policy is unable to 
address “asymmetric” shocks, where some countries experience negative shocks while others 
are booming. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) suggested that the risk sharing provided to states 
by the U.S. federal government may be essential in making the United States a successful 
“monetary union.”
1 
We refer to the situation where consumption grows at identical rates in all countries as 
full risk sharing. We refer to the growth rate of a country-level variable minus the union-wide 
counterpart as the “idiosyncratic” growth-rate and we say that risk sharing is higher the less 
idiosyncratic  consumption  growth  co-varies  with  idiosyncratic  income  growth.  There  are 
different ways that countries can obtain risk sharing which we refer to as channels of risk 
sharing.  The  main  channels  are  cross-ownership  of  assets  that  “smooth”  income  (making 
income growth in a country less sensitive to output growth in that country), transfers that 
smooth  disposable  income  for  given  income,  and  borrowing  and  lending  that  smooth 
consumption for given  disposable income. Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) (ASY) 
derived a simple way of quantifying the relative contributions of various channels of income 
and consumption smoothing within a common framework. ASY found, for U.S. states, that 
market institutions provide the bulk of risk sharing through income smoothing Sorensen and 
Yosha (1998) (SY) used similar methods to evaluate channels of risk sharing between EU and 
OECD  countries  and  found  that  the  bulk  of  risk  sharing  was  provided  by  procyclical 
government saving with some risk sharing provided by corporate saving at shorter horizons. 
In  this  paper,  we  explore  risk  sharing  patterns  among  EMU  countries  and,  for 
comparison,  long-standing  non-EMU  European  Union  (EU)-countries  as  well  as  other 
developed  countries  in  the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD). Our paper updates and expands on the results of SY. 
Mundell  (1961)  defined  an  optimum  currency  area  as  one  where  internal  factor 
mobility is high although two other criteria may be as important as labor mobility in the face of 
adverse  idiosyncratic  country  shocks.  One  obvious  criteria  is  whether  such  asymmetry  is 
prevalent. Frankel and Rose (1998), in a provocative article, argued that countries that this criteria 
may actually be endogenous to the formation of currency unions: A currency union is likely to 
generate more trade among its members and Frankel and Rose find that “more trade” leads to less 
asymmetry between the trading countries. 
It is feasible, indeed likely, that risk sharing is also endogenous to the formation of a 
currency union.
2 A common currency is likely to reduce the costs of trading or information 
gathering in asset trade and therefore lead to higher cross-ownership of financial assets. The 
removal of currency risk may further stimulate foreign direct investment and the integration 
of bond markets—already documented for the EMU see, for example, Adam et al. (2002) and 
Baele et al. (2004)—will imply deeper and more liquid markets for borrowing and lending.
3 
Less obvious is how important these effects are quantitatively for, in particular, the 
EMU. Six years have passed since the adoption of the Euro and while integration of financial 
 
1 See also von Hagen (1992), Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993), Goodhart and Smith (1993), and Bayoumi and 
Masson (1995). 
2 De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) consider more generally how the criteria for optimally of currency areas may 
be endogenous and provides evidence from the EMU. 
3 Sørensen, Wu, Yosha, and Zu (2005) show that larger holdings of foreign assets are associated with more 
international risk sharing. Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sørensen (2005) demonstrate that the integration of the 





markets likely takes time to evolve making it to early to draw definitive conclusions, we can 
get a preliminary reading.
4 
We find that smoothing through  factor income  flows—resulting  from international 
crossownership of assets—has increase steeply in the EMU. On the other hand, smoothing of 
consumption through government counter-cyclical saving has virtually disappeared for the 
group of EMU countries leading to less overall risk sharing. Whether this pattern is due to the 
constraints on fiscal deficits imposed by the Growth and Stability pact and whether it is a 
permanent pattern remains to be seen as the monetary union matures. 
 
Full risk sharing and perfect consumption smoothing: Theory 
 
The basic theory of international risk sharing is well known—see Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1996)—and we only outline the basic ideas for endowment economies. We think of GDP as 
a homogeneous tradable good. The period t per capita output of country i is an exogenous 
random  variable  with  a  commonly  known  probability  distribution.  Let  the  representative 
consumer of each country be a risk averse expected utility maximizer who derives utility from 
consumption.
5 Assume that consumers within each country are identical with felicity ranked 
by Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function and that perfect Arrow-Debreu markets 
for contingent claims exist. Optimal consumption then satisfies the full risk sharing relation 
  ,  where  ki  is  a  country  specific  constant,    is  country  i  per  capita 
consumption, and   is world per capita consumption in period t. An implication is that 
when risk is fully shared among countries, the consumption of a country comoves with world 
consumption but not with country specific shocks. 
If the period t utility function of country i is   where   is an idiosyncratic 
taste shock (normalized so that   in all periods), then consumption, assuming 
perfect markets for contingent output, will satisfy the relation  , in any state 
of nature. Consumption in country i is no longer a fixed fraction of world consumption, as is 
the case when there are no idiosyncratic taste shocks, but the central property of equation (1) 
is  preserved—the  consumption  of  country  i  is  affected  by  aggregate  shocks  and  by 
idiosyncratic taste shocks, but not by other idiosyncratic shocks (including income shocks). 
The testable implication that we will focus on is that consumption growth rates are 
identical for all countries; i.e., 
 
where c is a constant and  is an error term—due to either taste shocks or noise—which is 
uncorrelated with output growth. 
 
4 Shocks to the EMU economies have become more shallow in the last decade as documented by, for example, 
Ginannone and Reichlin (2005)—potentially reducing the importance of risk sharing. This reduced volatility 
seems  to  be  a  world-wide  phenomenon  and  the  reasons  for  it  are  not  well  understood,  leaving  open  the 
possibility that this is a temporary pattern. 
5 We do not consider non-separabilities in the utility function between consumption and leisure or nontradable 
output.  See  Canova  and  Ravn  (1996)  and  Lewis  (1996)  for  a  treatment  of  these  issues  in  the  context  of 
international risk sharing. 
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Regression based tests for full risk sharing at the country level were conducted by 
Obstfeld  (1994),  Canova  and  Ravn  (1996)  and  Lewis  (1996).
6  A  comprehensive  survey  of 
research on international diversification is provided in Lewis (1995).
7 
Even if full risk sharing is rejected it is important to quantify the extent to which risk 
is shared within a group of economic agents, countries in our case. It is also interesting to 
identify the exact channels through which risk is shared, and to quantify the amount of risk 
sharing obtained via each channel. ASY developed a method for answering these questions. 
The  method  takes  equation  (1)  as  a  benchmark,  and  quantifies  the  deviation  from  this 
benchmark, interpreting the deviation as the amount of risk that is not shared. We turn to a 
presentation of the conceptual framework and the method of measuring deviations from the 
full risk sharing allocation. 
 
Channels of Income Insurance and Consumption Smoothing 
 
There are several mechanisms for sharing risk among countries. The most natural way 
or sharing risk internationally is through international income diversification; i.e., through 
cross-border ownership of productive assets. Net income from foreign assets is reflected in 
the National Accounts data as the difference between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
Gross National Income (GNI).
8 
If risk is fully shared through this channel GNI will satisfy equation (1): 
                                           (2) 
If risk is not fully shared through factor income flows, GNI does not satisfy equation 
(1) and there may be scope for further income smoothing. One source of income smoothing is 
simply that the amount of depreciation doesn’t vary one-to-one with GDP—this source of risk 
sharing is not very interesting but it is included because we want to consider all “wedges” 
between  GDP  and  consumption.  GNI  minus  depreciation  is  (net)  National  Income  (NI). 
Income  can  further  be  smoothed  through  international  transfers.  We  refer  to  NI  plus  net 
(incoming) international transfers as Disposable National Income (DNI). 
If  DNI  is  not perfectly  diversified there is  room for  consumption smoothing  through 
procyclical saving behavior. Individuals decide on their saving in order to smooth consumption 
intertemporally. If the shocks to GDP that are not smoothed through international factor income 
flows are highly persistent, individuals may—if there behavior is guided by permanent income 
considerations—-optimally choose to engage in very little consumption smoothing through saving 
although patterns of life-cycle saving may or may not help smooth consumption. If the shocks to 
GDP that are not smoothed through international factor income flows are transitory, individuals 
will optimally choose to engage in much consumption smoothing through saving.
9 
 
6 The first tests for full risk sharing, using individual-level data were performed by Cochrane (1991), Mace 
(1991) and Townsend (1994). 
7 The International Real Business Cycle literature, most notably Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992), Baxter and 
Crucini (1995) and Stockman and Tesar (1995) have examined the of full risk sharing in the absence of taste 
shocks, that the correlation of consumption across countries should be equal to unity. The data are, however, far 
from confirming that prediction.  
8 GNI was previously called Gross National Product (GNP). 
9 Baxter and Crucini’s (1995) showed that even if is no income insurance through factor income flows but a 
riskless asset that can be traded then, if shocks to GDP are transitory, equation (1) will be closely approximated. 
That is, when shocks to GDP are transitory, a riskless bond (the credit market) is a close substitute for income 
insurance (i.e. for capital markets). In contrast, if shocks to GDP are highly persistent, consumption smoothing 





The  variance  decomposition  described  below  allows  us  to  measure  the  fraction  of 
shocks to GDP that are smoothed through international factor income flows, through saving, 
and  the  fraction  of  shocks  that  are  not  smoothed,  namely,  the  residual  deviation  of  the 
international consumption allocation from equation (1), the full risk sharing benchmark. 
 
Decomposing the Cross-Sectional Variance of Shocks to GDP 
 
We turn to the cross-sectional variance decomposition of shocks to GDP—for further 
details and interpretation see ASY or SY. Consider the identity, holding for any period t, 
 
 
where all the magnitudes are in per capita terms, and i is an index of countries. To stress 
the cross-sectional nature of our derivation, we suppress the time index. 
Now take logs and differences on both sides of (3), multiply both sides by _log GDPi 
(minus its mean) and take the cross-sectional average, obtaining the variance decomposition 
 
In  this  equation  “var  {  X  }”  and  “cov  {  X,Y  }”  denote  the  statistics  
and    respectively,  where  N  is  the 
number of countries in the sample. Dividing by var   we get 
                       
 
where, for example, 
 
is the ordinary least squares estimate of the slope in the cross-sectional regression of 
 and similarly for  . The last 
coefficient in the decomposition is given by: 
 
 
through trade in a riskless bond will not approximate the allocation in equation (1), namely, the credit market 
will not closely mimic the role of capital markets—shocks that were not insured ex-ante on capital markets will 
not be smoothed ex-post on credit markets. Macroeconomic Issues 
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which is the ordinary least squares estimate of the slope in the cross-sectional regression  
 
We turn to the predictions of the theory regarding the signs and magnitudes of these 
coefficients.  If  there  is  full  risk  sharing,  that  is,  if  equation  (1)  holds,  then  
and  hence  If  full  risk  sharing  is  not 
achieved, then consumption in country i varies positively with idiosyncratic shocks to country 
i’s output, and   A cross-sectional regression of consumption on output, controlling 
for fluctuations in world consumption is, therefore, a test of full risk sharing.
10 
If full risk sharing is achieved through income insurance via factor income flows, GNI 
will  satisfy  equation  (1).  Then  and  hence, 
implying 
Moreover,  in  this  case,  since  consumers  in  each  country  consume  their  GNI, 
namely,  consumption satisfies equation (1) implying  .
11 
 
Suppose that full risk sharing is not achieved through income insurance via factor 
income  flows  and  capital  depreciation,  but  is  achieved  through  the  combination of factor 
income flows, depreciation, and international transfers. Then DNI will satisfy equation (1) 
and, by analogous reasoning,  and since consumers in each country will  
consume their DNI,  Similarly, if the full risk sharing allocation is achieved through 
factor  income  flows,  depreciation,  international  transfers,  and  saving,  C+G  will  satisfy 
equation (1). Then, by analogous reasoning,   
  is  the  fraction  of  shocks  to  GDP  that  is  not  smoothed.  The  coefficients 
  are  interpreted  as  the  fraction  of  shocks  absorbed  through  factor 
income flows, depreciation, international transfers, and saving, respectively. If consumption 
satisfies equation (1), they sum to unity and  If not, they sum to less than unity. In 
either case, they reflect the incremental amount of smoothing achieved through the various 
channels discussed above. 
We not impose any restrictions on the sign of the β-coefficients. If a country that is hit 
by a positive shock has a smaller share of GDP allocated to, e.g., capital consumption, then  
depreciation provides cross-sectional dis-smoothing. Similarly, if taxes increase or decrease 
less than proportionately with output, they provide dis-smoothing. 
 
10 This is precisely the test suggested by Mace (1991) and Townsend (1994). They test for full risk sharing by 
running cross-sectional (or panel) regressions of consumption on income, controlling for aggregate movements 
in income and consumption. Cochrane’s (1991) test is very similar. 
11  





The  role  of  Government,  Personal,  and  Corporate  Saving  in  Consumption 
Smoothing 
 
Net national saving consists of three components: personal, corporate, and government 
saving. This role of each of these components in consumption smooth can help shed light on 
institutional barriers to consumption smoothing—in particular whether the 1992 Maastricht 
requirements regarding government debt, and the subsequent Stability and Growth Pact, have 
been impediments to risk sharing.
12 
The  corporate  sector  may  contribute  to  income  insurance  if  it  adjusts  patterns  of 
earnings  retention  so  that  a  larger  share  of  profits  is  distributed  to  shareholders  during 
recessions.
13 
Individuals  can  smooth  consumption  through  personal  saving  by  borrowing  and 
lending.  The  ability  of  individuals  to  smooth  their  consumption  through  cross-country 
borrowing and lending depends on whether the banking system, and credit markets in general, 
are sufficiently integrated internationally—otherwise, say, an increase in the demand for loans 
may increase the domestic interest rate leading to less borrowing. Ostergaard, Sørensen, and 
Yosha (2001) and Sørensen and Yosha (2000) find that aggregate state-level consumption 
and, therefore, savings patterns are closer to the prediction of the Permanent Income Model 
than aggregate country-level consumption. Whether this implies more or less risk sharing at 
the country-level in our metric depends on the time-series properties of shocks to disposable 
income. 
 
 Allocation of Saving 
 
The  amount  of  consumption  smoothing  achieved  through  saving  can  also  be 
decomposed according to the “destination” of savings, namely, domestic physical investment 
versus investment abroad. Net investment abroad equals the current account surplus CA and S 
= I + CA, where “I” denotes net domestic physical investment. If higher saving in a country in 
a particular year is mainly reflected in higher investment in that country in the same year, this 
would indicate that international investment patterns do not respond strongly to shocks and, 
therefore, do not contribute to cross-country consumption smoothing. The well-known paper 
by Feldstein and Horioka (1982) raises the question of why saving and investment at the 
country-level are so highly correlated. While there may be conditions where this is an optimal 
outcome, a high correlation between investment and saving is typically considered a symptom 
of lack of international financial integration. 
In theoretical work risk sharing is typically modeled as the shipping of goods abroad 
in  good  times.
14  We  denote  net  export  by  and  examine  if  is 
smoothed relative to output (after controlling for the aggregate). 
 
Estimation 
Estimating channels of risk sharing 
 
At the practical level, the following (panel) equations are estimated: 
 
 
12 Gali and Perotti (2003) find that the Maastricht rules in practice have not limited the ability of fiscal policy in 
the EMU to be counter-cyclical. However, their metric is somewhat different from our risk sharing measure. 
13 This is consistent with the standard textbook view that corporations smooth dividend payout ratios, adjusting 
them only in response to shifts in long-run sustainable earnings; see, e.g., Brealey and Myers (1991, Chapter 16). 
14 See Heathcote and Perri (2004) for an example. Macroeconomic Issues 
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where _·,t  are time fixed effects. The time  fixed effects capture  year specific impacts on 
growth rates, most notably the impact of the growth in aggregate EMU (or OECD) output 
Furthermore, with time fixed effects the _-coefficients are weighted averages of the year-by 
year  cross-sectional  regressions.  To  take  into  account  autocorrelation  in  the  residuals  we 
assume that the error terms in each equation and in each country follow an AR(1) process. 
Since the samples are short, we assume that the autocorrelation parameter is identical across 
countries and equations. We further allow for state specific variances of the error terms. In 
practice,  we  estimate  the  system  in  (7)  by  a  two  step  Generalized  Least  Squares  (GLS) 
procedure.  Unless  we  explicitly  say  otherwise,  we  use  differenced  data  at  the  yearly 
frequency. Because our method is based on panel estimation with time fixed effects, it yields 
fully consistent estimates even if there are worldwide taste shocks. 
 
            Estimating economic determinants of risk sharing 
 
Consider, for example, the estimated income smoothing from factor income flows, 
M´elitz  and  Zumer  (1999)  impose  structure  on 
where  is  an  “interaction”  variable  that  affects  the 
amount of smoothing that country i obtains. Sørensen, Wu, Yosha, and Zhu extended this 
method by allowing  to change over time, as follows: 
 
 
where Xit is a variable that potentially may impact on risk sharing. We subtract the mean of 
the “interaction variables” in order to leave the interpretation of    as the average amount 
of income smoothing. We experiment with variables such as average size of country i which 
varies across countries but not over time, and with variables such as the U.S. interest rate 
which varies over time but not across countries. 









We,  similarly,  examine  if  the  amount  of  consumption  smoothing  from  saving, 





The data are from the OECD National Accounts, Main Aggregates (Volume I) and 
Detailed  Tables  (Volume  II),  various  issues,  covering  the  period  1970–2003.  The  OECD 
countries in our sample consist of all 2005 members except Luxembourg (very small and 
atypical),  Iceland  (incomplete  data),  and  the  less  developed  countries:  Czech  Republic, 
Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, and Turkey. In order to compare the results, we 
use three subsets of the OECD members in the various regressions. The EMU countries with 
the  exception  of  Luxembourg.
15  The  EU  denotes  all  the  2003  EU  member  countries, 
excluding Luxembourg.
16 OECD–EU denotes the OECD members in our sample excluding 
the 14 member countries of the EU.
17 
 
Income insurance and consumption smoothing among EMU and OECD 
countries 
 
We begin by presenting our estimates of the fraction of shocks to GDP absorbed at the 
various levels of smoothing for EMU, EU, and OECD countries. 
In Table 1 we display the estimated percentages of shocks to GDP smoothed through 
each  channel,  among  EMU,  EU,  Non-EU  developed  OECD  (“OECD”)  countries,  for  the 
period 1970–2003. Conceptually, the coefficients add up to 100 percent but we choose not to 
impose this constraint. 
From  the  first  line  in  Table  1  it  is  immediately  apparent  that  the  contribution  of 
crosscountry factor income flows to cross-country risk sharing, among EMU as well as OECD 
countries, has not been significantly different from zero for our sample period. This is the result 
that SY found for the period previous to 1990. Of course, it is well known that cross-country 
assets holdings were very small during that period as documented by French and Poterba (1991) 
and Tesar and Werner (1995), so this result is no big surprise. Note that factor income flows are 
almost solely dividend, interest, and other earnings accruing to capital. Income of, say, a U.S. 
resident working in the U.K. is also part of factor income, but earnings of, say, a Turkish citizen 
who is a resident of Germany is part of German GNI and doesn’t enter factor income flows. 
Depreciation  contributed  negatively  to  income  smoothing.  This  variable  isn’t  very 
interesting  because  depreciation  is  a  function  of  past  investment  and,  besides,  is  mainly 
imputed. However, the negative sign is intuitive because when output goes up depreciation 
typically doesn’t move with output and therefore a larger share of output is available for 
income and consumption. We will not comment on this channel much. 
During  the  1971–2003  sample  period  transfers  did  not  contribute  to  risk  sharing. 
Transfers include official transfers, such as contributions to the EU budget and foreign aid, 
and workers remittances which, on average during this period, were fairly small. 
The fourth line in Table 1 indicates that the bulk of the consumption smoothing of EU 
and OECD countries is achieved via saving. Such smoothing need not involve actual cross-
 
15 The EMU consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Spain. 
16 The EU consists of the EMU countries plus Denmark, Sweden and the U.K. 
17 OECD–EU consists of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States. Macroeconomic Issues 
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border flows of funds but can be reflected in domestic fixed or inventory investment. The 
point estimate for consumption smoothing through national saving is higher for the OECD 
countries  but  the  difference  is  not  statistically  significant.  Overall,  two-thirds  of    output 
shocks were not smoothed during this period. SY found virtually identical results for the 
period 1966–1980 and for the OECD (including EU) in the 1980s. For the core EU countries 
they found lower consumption smoothing from saving in the 1980s. We will examine how our 
results vary by subperiods and in particular if risk sharing has increased in the EMU in recent 
periods. 
 
SY stated: “..the large amount of consumption smoothing achieved in the European 
Community  via  government  borrowing  may  not  be  sustainable  in  an  EMU  where  fiscal 
coordination must be maintained. Until private capital and credit markets develop, there may 
be a need for a greater insurance role of European Community institutions.” To throw light 
over this issue Table 2 repeats the exercise of Table 1 for the period 1999—2003 after the 
introduction  of  the  Euro.  Two  things  have  changed  noticeably:  First,  factor  income  now 
smooth 11 percent of GDP shocks in the EMU and still nothing in the OECD and, second, 
consumption  smoothing  through  national  savings  has  decreased  steeply  in  the  EMU  and 
increased in the OECD with the net result being that 72 percent of shocks to GDP in the 
OECD  are  smoothed  while  only  34  percent  are  smoothed  in  the  EMU.  Also,  transfers 
contribute modestly, but significantly, to income smoothing in the EMU. We do not have 





three EU members that are not member of the EMU.
18 However, including the non-EMU EU 
countries weakens the effect of factor income smoothing lending at least weak support to the 
notion that the common currency is helping this channel of risk sharing. 
 
Did factor income smoothing increase slowly over the full sample or steeply after the 
introduction  of  the  Euro?  Table  3  addresses  this  question.  The  answer  is:  factor  income 
smoothing rose steeply after the introduction of the Euro. The table also shows that factor 
income smoothing robustly has been zero before 1999—the one significant number for the 
1970s for the EMU is the lone significant number before that period. This is consistent with 
the large decline in home bias in asset holdings documented by, for example, Sørensen, Wu, 
Yosha, and Zu (2005). However, foreign asset holdings need to be very large in order to 
provide significant smoothing. To fix thoughts, think of the case where all capital in a country 
 
18 Particularly since a country like Denmark ties its currency very tightly to the Euro so that it isn’t really 
obvious how it would be better classified Macroeconomic Issues 
  410 
is owned by foreigners and residents of the country own foreign assets in the same amount. 
The capital output ratio is often assumed to be around three so, roughly, this would be a case 
where the level foreign asset holdings is three times GDP. Assume, as is also often done, that 
one third of GDP accrues to capital. Then one would expect 33 percent of output shocks to be 
smoothed by factor income. Consider how our measure works in a 1-period case where GDP 
in a country starts at GDP0 and GDP1 = 1.1 _ GDP0. If world per capita GDP in both periods 
is fixed at GDP0 then GNI1 = .33*GDP0+0.66*GDP1 = GDP0 + 0.66 * (GDP1 − GDP0). 
We have ∆log GDP1 ≈0.66 * ∆log GDP1 which show that 33 percent of the output shock is 
smoothed by factor income. 
 
.  In the example, there are really two reasons why factor income smooth output: First, 
when output goes up factor income paid to other countries increases—proportionally to output 
in our simple example and, secondly, factor income received does not move oneto- one with 
output. In reality, many other patterns can occur and it is possible for factor income to even 
dis-smooth. An example would be a country that pays interest on debt and pays a very large 
risk premium on bonds issued. In the face of high domestic growth the risk premium on debt 
may decline and interest payment to foreigners may decline. The high growth is overall a 
good situation for the country, but it does result in negative insurance. Of course, the reverse 





situation for OECD countries may be one where a country has a large net debt position and 
the world interest rate falls, to take a concrete example, leading to lower debt payments. If 
creditor countries happen to grow fast during such a period while debtor countries grow 
slowly debt holdings could contribute negatively to risk sharing. 
Table 4 examines the contributions to risk sharing from factor income paid and factor 
income received. We see some negative income smoothing from outgoing factor income in 
the 1980s for EMU and EU countries and, not statistically significant, for the OECD. We 
suspect this is related to the high interest rates during this period. During the 1990s factor 
income received provided strong negative risk sharing in the EMU and the EU while factor 
income paid contributed roughly the same amount but positively. Finally, since the adoption 
of the Euro we see strong risk sharing benefits from incoming and outgoing factor income in 
the Euro countries with no significant coefficients for the other country groups. (The point 
estimates are not statistically significant but we know from Table 2 that the combined impact 
is strongly significant.) This is suggestive of deeper capital market integration taking place 
among EMU countries, but the sample is still too short for firm conclusions. 
 Macroeconomic Issues 
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Table 5 displays a similar breakdown by subperiods for transfers. Transfers contribute 
positively to income smoothing in the EU area since 1980. Likely from the combined impact 
of EU official transfers and remittances. The magnitude is not large, about 5 percent in the 
1980s and 1990s and a bit smaller since 1999 but the impact is statistically significant and 
appears robust. For no subperiod do transfers smooth income in the OECD outside of the EU. 
 
Savings contribute little to consumption smoothing in the EMU since 1999. Is that a 
recent  phenomenon?  Table  6  addresses  that  issue.  For  all  subperiods  are  the  amount  of 
consumption smoothing through saving smaller in the EMU and the EU. The numbers are 
never larger in the EU than in the EMU so the indication is that this may have more to do with 
EU institutions than with the common currency. The divergence since 1999 is striking. We 
examined if the high numbers for the OECD were due to an outlier like Norway, where the 






Table 7 considers smoothing through government saving. The decline in smoothing 
from government saving since 1999 is very steep in the EMU and similarly when the whole 
EU  is  considered.  In  the  OECD  smoothing  from  government  saving,  on  the  contrary, 
increased steeply after 1999. Tables 8 and 9 consider smoothing from corporate and personal 
saving,  respectively.  There  seem  to  be  no  time  pattern  in  the  smoothing  from  corporate 
saving. In the EMU and EU corporate saving smoothes consumption in most periods while it 
is insignificant in the OECD for all sub-periods. Private saving, examined in Table 8, has 
been dis-smoothing (counter-cyclical) in the EMU and EU until 1999 after which the effect is 
small and positive—statistically significant for the EMU.  In the OECD the pattern is the 
opposite. It is intriguing that private saving seems to counteract the pattern in government 
saving. Macroeconomic Issues 
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In Figures 1–4 we illustrate the results discussed so far in graphical form. Figure 1 
shows the total amount smoothed and the contribution from saving. While there is some noise 
the  pattern  of  increasing  contributions  from  saving  in  the  OECD  is  fairly  clear  and  the 
decreasing  contribution  from  saving  in  the  EMU  is  particularly  clear.  In  the  OECD  the 
combined contribution from other channels of smoothing is negative in all years while in the 
EMU this is, fortunately, not the case: as the contribution from saving has declined to near 
zero by the new century other channels of smoothing kept the overall amount of risk sharing 
at about 40 percent. Figure 2 displays the contributions from transfers and factor income. 
Factor income smoothing seems to have a tendency to dis-smooth for most of the period until 
the recent period. Smoothing from transfers were initially negative but turned positive in the 
EMU around 1980 with a slow decline since the mid 1980s. In the OECD transfers do not 
contribute either way. Figure 3 shows the contributions from components of saving. In the 
OECD government saving provided the bulk of the smoothing—in particular since 1992— 
although  corporate  saving  started  to  contribute  noticeably  in  the  late  1992.  In  the  EMU 
corporate  saving  is  now  more  important  for  smoothing  the  government  saving.  Personal 
saving used to be counter-cyclical leading to strong dis-smoothing of  consumption in the 
1980s, although the role of private saving now is minor as it is in the OECD. In Figure 4 we 
display the simple ratio of the savings components to GDP. The ratio of government saving to 
GDP takes big dips in the OECD during the recessions in the early 1980s, the early 1990s, 
and early in the present century which is what our regressions correctly pick up. In the EMU 
this pattern is much less strong—it seems that for some reason EMU governments ran up 
large deficits until the mid-1990s after which they increased saving, presumably to meet the 
Maastricht criteria. Overall, we are left wondering if this is particularly optimal pattern of Macroeconomic Issues 
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saving although we of course do not evaluate the myriad of non-risk sharing consideration 
that may have motivated this. Counter-cyclical behavior of corporate saving is visible since 
1990 in the EMU. 
We turn to the decomposition of smoothing via saving into smoothing via domestic 
net physical investment and the current account. We also consider net exports. We measure 
the fraction of shocks smoothed via domestic net investment by estimating the coefficient in 
the regression of   Similarly, we measure 
the fraction of shocks smoothed via the current account surplus (“investment abroad”) as the 
slope in the regression of   Due to non-
linearity (and to the way we correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation) the smoothing 
from the current account and from investment will not add up to the smoothing from saving 
but conceptually it is a decomposition of this smoothing. 
The  results,  displayed  in  Table  10,  for  the  full  sample,  indicate  that  the  bulk  of 
smoothing is achieved via domestic investment, not the current account and not through net 
exports. The finding that shocks to output are smoothed via domestic net physical investment 
is consistent with the procyclical behavior of investment in aggregate US data; see Blanchard 
and Fischer (1989). 
 
Table 11 considers the smoothing from domestic investment by subperiods. In the 





1980s and 1990s and for the 1999-2003 period the impact is only 11 percent in the EMU and 
insignificant in the EU. In the OECD the decline is smaller and net investment still smooth 25 
percent of shocks. This may be a reflection of lack of capital market integration “forcing” 
countries to invest savings domestically. 
 
Table 12 considers the role of the current account. Surprisingly, the current account 
contributed negatively, or not at all, before 1999. In the period after 1999 there is no effect in 
the EMU (reflecting that overall saving is not contributing to consumption smoothing) but for 
the  OECD  this  channel  contributes  35  percent  to  consumption  smoothing.  This  result 




19 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) argue that the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle is a thing of the past in the Euro area. Macroeconomic Issues 
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We use a similar regression to see if net exports smooth income: the coefficient in the 
regression  of      measures  the 
fraction of shocks. The results—see Table 13—show that until very  recently, net exports 
played no role in consumption smoothing. However, for the OECD countries there has been a 






Table 14 examines if the results are different when the time-period considered is three 
years, rather than one. SY found that consumption smoothing was significantly lower at the 
three-year frequency, in particular due to smoothing through corporate saving being of short 
duration.
20 Comparing the results with those of Table 1, we see slightly less risk sharing at the 
longer horizon but not significantly less so.
21 
 
20 Becker and Hoffmann (2006) perform a more systematic examination of risk sharing at different frequncies. 
21 This sample includes only one observation per country so the results are imprecisely estimated as indicated by 
the large standard error. Clearly more observations are needed to corroborate that this result reflects more than 
transitory conditions. Macroeconomic Issues 
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ASY and SY found evidence that smoothing from cross-ownership of assets is much 
more “permanent” than smoothing from saving. In Table 15 we examine smoothing from factor 
income in the upper panel and from saving in the lower panel by sub-periods. In the EMU we find 
a very large smoothing effect from factor income for 2000–2002. Due to the short sample this is 










22 These results are mainly suggestive and we choose to end the sample in 2002 because this break-up into sub-
periods gives the strongest contrast between the 1990s and the 2000s. Macroeconomic Issues 
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Tables 16–17 and Tables 18–19 study if income smoothing from factor income and 
consumption  smoothing,  respectively,  vary  systematically  with  time,  interest  rates  etc. 
Sørensen, Wu, Yosha, and Zhu (2005) showed that risk sharing increase with holdings of 
foreign assets and we do not revisit that issue. Instead we follow M´elitz and Zumer (1999) 
and examine if smaller countries obtain more risk sharing and if risk sharing depends on the 
world (U.S.) interest rate. A country with large net holdings of bonds will receive a larger 
amount of income from these when interest rates are high, typically leading to higher income 
smoothing  for  such  countries.  We  further  examine  if  risk  sharing  is  correlated  with  the 
average output of countries, with the aggregate business cycle (the output of our total sample 
filtered through a Hodrick-Prescott filter), and with the country level interest rate. We show 
results for an early (1971–1987) and a late (1988–2003) sample. We also include a dummy 
variable for EMU countries—this allows to examine if the different results found for the 
EMU remains when we allow explanatory variables to determine the amount of risk sharing. 
For income smoothing from international factor income we find that richer (higher 
output) countries obtained significantly less income smoothing in the early part of the sample. 
This result also hold for the later sample (Table 17) but no longer with statistical significance. 
The world interest rate seems to have no effect, while the trend is insignificant but negative in 
the early sample and positive and significant in the later sample—this isn’t surprising given 
our earlier results. Our other interaction variables are not significant in the early sample but 
for the later sample the EMU dummy is (near) significant at the standard five percent level. 
For consumption smoothing through saving we find in Table 18 that richer countries 
tended to obtain more consumption smoothing but the result isn’t statistically significant. The 
world interest rate had a significant negative impact on consumption smoothing while the 
trend was clearly positive. EMU countries obtained dramatically less consumption smoothing 
as did large countries. In the later sample—shown in the Table 19—these results still obtain, 
indicating that these patterns are robust. In the later sample we further find that consumption 
smoothing through saving is positively—and significantly—correlated with the country-level 
interest rate. 
Overall, our results show that the ability to smooth consumption internationally is 
strongly dependent on country characteristics such as wealth and size and on international 
conditions such a world interest rates. A deeper study of this is far beyond the present paper 
but these results serve to demonstrate that the different patterns of risk sharing found for the 
EMU countries are not simply capturing variables such as size and wealth that were left out in 
the earlier tables. 
4 Concluding Remarks 
TO COME 
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